Abstract Drawing on observations from tracking changes in local health care markets over the past ten years, this article critiques two Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice recommendations to enhance price and quality competition. First, we take issue with the notion that consumers, acting independently, will drive greater competition in health care markets. Rather we suggest an important role remains for trusted agents who can analyze inherently complex price and quality information and negotiate on consumers' behalf. With aggregated information identifying providers who deliver cost-effective care, consumers would be better positioned to respond to financial incentives about where to seek care and thereby drive more meaningful competition among providers to reduce costs and improve quality. Second, we take issue with the FTC/DOJ recommendation to provide more direct subsidies to prevent distortions in competition. In the current political environment, it is not practical to provide direct subsidies for all of the unfunded care that exists in health care markets today; instead, some interference with competition may be necessary to protect cross subsidies. Barriers can be reduced, though, by revising pricing policies that have resulted in marked disparities in the relative profitability of different services.
tion does not appear to be leading to better performance by providers in terms of cost or quality.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) sought to address these concerns in an ambitious set of hearings held between February and October 2003 on the state of competition in health care. The report, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (FTC/DOJ 2004) , summarizes findings from the hearings and makes a series of recommendations to encourage more effective competition in health care markets. In this article, we focus on two of the recommendations intended to help promote competition on price and quality, discussing some practical concerns and some suggested refinements to the recommendations.
Our perspective is based on more than ten years of experience tracking health care markets through the Center for Studying Health System Change's longitudinal study of local health care markets, known as the Community Tracking Study. The study consists of periodic, nationally representative surveys of households and physicians as well as biannual site visits to twelve communities that were randomly selected to be representative of communities with a population of 200,000 or more. Together these sources provide insight into the changes occurring in the organization and competitive dynamic of local health care markets across the country and the effects on care delivery and consumer experience with the health care system (Kemper et al. 1996; Ginsburg 2005) . Indeed, each of us, as well as other members of our team, testified at the aforementioned hearings.
Incentives to Lower Costs and Improve Quality: Some Practical Impediments and Implications for Policy Makers
The FTC/DOJ report's first recommendation is that private payers, governments, and providers should continue experiments to improve incentives for providers to lower costs and enhance quality and for consumers to seek lower prices and better quality. Specifically, the report recommends that private payers, governments, and providers should improve measures of price and quality, furnish more information on prices and quality to consumers in ways that they find useful and relevant, and continue to experiment with financing structures that encourage consumers to use such information. In addition, the report recommends that private payers, governments, and providers should experiment further with payment methods for aligning providers' incentives with consumers' interests in lower prices, quality improvements, and innovation.
We see many virtues in the spirit of this recommendation; indeed, this is where much of the innovation in health care finance is focused today. But we take issue with the emphasis on consumers acting independently as the key mechanism to drive price and quality competition in health care. Although consumer-directed health care is all the rage today, we are concerned that the potential influence of price information and financial incentives on consumers' decisions about use of services has been oversold. That is not to say that there is no role for improved price and quality information to help invigorate greater competition in health care markets. But we believe that this approach is too dependent on individual consumers making use of inherently complex data on prices and quality of care. Advocates of this approach downplay the importance of trusted agents for consumers to analyze price and quality data and to negotiate for them with providers. An effective model of consumer-driven health care would involve agents using straightforward incentives to direct consumers toward providers that they have determined offer superior value. This would, in turn, provide more powerful incentives for providers to reduce their costs and improve their quality.
Limits to Consumers' Role in Driving Increased Price and Quality Competition in Health Care
The notion that consumers can drive greater competition in health care markets rests on the assumption that patients have the potential for significant influence on the quantity and/or price of health care services they use. Even with financial incentives to curtail service use and with comparative quality information, individual consumers do not have a strong track record at making cost-effective decisions about use of health care services. And, despite much touting of the virtues of price transparency, we are skeptical that individual patients can obtain lower prices than insurers do on their behalf.
Limits to Consumers' Decision Making about Use of Services
Consumers' effectiveness as decision makers about appropriate use of services is limited by a number of factors. First, it is problematic to assume that a patient is in a good position to contemplate price at the point of service, especially in those situations that account for the bulk of health spending -when a patient is seriously ill. Practically speaking, most patients today use services at the recommendation of their usual physician or health care provider. Some may seek out a second opinion to determine whether there are viable alternatives, and increasingly patients consult other sources of information, often via the Internet, to have informed discussions with their usual provider about the best course of action. However, given the complexity of the information pertinent to these decisions, patients tend to rely on the recommendations of a trusted health care professional as a valued agent to guide their decision making.
Second, there are limits to the effectiveness of financial incentives to encourage consumers to curtail unnecessary services. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment demonstrated that financial incentives do influence consumers' use of services, but the problem was that patients were just as likely to restrict needed services as unneeded care (Siu 1986 ). Moreover, the financial incentives common in current benefit designs apply only to a relatively small part of care that is delivered. Even plans with a substantial deductible and coinsurance requirements have a maximum on out-ofpocket liability and therefore will not have much impact on the 20 percent of the population that accounts for 80 percent of health care spending (Conwell and Cohen 2005) . Finally, although serious efforts are going into providing more useful information for consumers to make decisions, past research is not very encouraging about consumers' use of this information. For example, despite increased public disclosure of comparative quality information about providers, empirical research has shown that consumers rarely seek out or use this information, largely because they do not understand and/or trust it (Marshall et al. 2000; Schneider and Lieberman 2001) .
Limits to Consumers' Ability to Drive Down Provider Prices
Another popular notion in health care today is that greater price transparency -that is, disclosure of the price differences across providers -will help to drive down provider prices. But we are very skeptical about this prospect in the context of health care markets today. First, there is the question, lower prices compared to what? The most common form of private health insurance today is the preferred provider organization (PPO), which offers consumers access to a network of providers at substantially discounted prices. We are very skeptical that many consumers would prefer -or achieve better results from -alternate forms of health insurance that do not have a provider network but offer extensive information on provider prices. In addition, the concentration of hospital markets, in particular, would likely undercut the potential of price transparency. In situations in which markets are concentrated, price disclosure can be useful to competing providers as well as consumers. To the degree that a provider believes that any price cut will be matched by competitors, the provider will be less likely to offer one. Thus, if price disclosure limits the opportunity to offer secret price reductions, the net effect could be higher prices. As a result, we are wary that, in practice, disclosure of prices paid to different providers would ultimately harm consumers by resulting in higher prices on average. 1
Incentives to Select Efficient Providers: A More Promising Approach
Despite limits to individual consumers' direct impact on service use and price, consumer decisions about where to receive care plays a very important role in driving competition today and is a force that could be harnessed to promote more cost-effective care delivery. Although financial incentives have not proved effective at restricting patient use of unneeded care at the point of service, there is evidence that consumers respond to financial incentives to determine where they receive care. Today, decisions about where to obtain services are shaped by financial incentives to use in-network providers, and our survey research has shown for many years that there is a willingness among many consumers to restrict provider choice in order to lower their out-of-pocket costs and that this willingness has begun to increase (Tu 2005) . Indeed, a great deal of the innovation in health plan product design today is focusing on differentiating provider networks more starkly for their enrollees, typically by creating differential copayment or coinsurance requirements for different classes or tiers of providers (Mays, Claxton, and White 2004; Draper and Claxton 2004) .
Although most tiered-network products appear to have stalled out, next generation versions of the idea, often called high-performance networks, have gained a lot of interest. The newer products focus on physician practices within a specialty and place more emphasis on measured quality in identifying the providers for which consumers are offered the lowest patient cost sharing. In those communities in which these products have been introduced, many employers who had little interest in tiered hospital networks have incorporated the mechanism into their health plans. This approach aggregates a wide range of information on quality and costs and incorporates it into the design of the health insurance product, sparing consumers the need to acquire and analyze all of this information on their own.
The problem with this approach is not only the challenge of developing methodologically sound measures of cost-efficiency, but also potential for substantial provider resistance. In our observations of local health care markets over the past ten years, we have seen many instances in which providers have successfully thwarted payer efforts to include measures of clinical quality in their network selection and payment methodologies (Christianson and Trude 2003) . And the highly concentrated nature of hospital markets today gives providers significant clout to push back on these initiatives.
Indeed, provider resistance has proved to be a significant obstacle to the formation of tiered networks. In four of our twelve study sites, health plans that had attempted to establish tiered provider networks abandoned their efforts after large hospital systems refused to participate and threatened to drop out of their networks altogether. In communities that have operational tiered-network products, we found providers were able to successfully negotiate out of the less desirable tier despite their higher costs. In fact, one health plan's tiered-network product ultimately had no providers included in the less desirable tier (Mays, Claxton, and Strunk 2003) .
Steps toward a Solution: Need for Neutral Party
Making better use of information on costs and quality to support more effective competition in health care will require two things: more extensive data that can be used to assess quality and sophisticated analysis of that data that can be made accessible to consumers. Obtaining more extensive data will involve both devising measures to supplement what can be claims data and making the data that are collected accessible to those entities that will be analyzing it for consumers. Some have discussed the potential for a single neutral party -whether a government agency or a public-private partnership -to provide a forum for identifying meaningful measures of quality and efficiency that could be agreed upon by the provider and payer community alike. Ideally, this entity would identify appropriate measures and assemble the raw data from providers, but it would leave the analysis of the data to competing health insurers or independent vendors.
The federal government may be the most likely candidate to serve as a neutral intermediary in these efforts. Indeed, the new tax provisions that encourage use of health savings accounts (HSAs) and health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) give federal policy makers good reason to enter into the work of developing accurate measures of provider quality and efficiency, as these product designs will put consumers at greater financial risk for decisions about where they seek care. The promotion of more viable infrastructure to support such products could help to deflect calls for greater regulation of these new product types in the future. However, entities such as the National Quality Forum or the National Committee on Quality Assurance have proved more adept at convening stakeholders to reach consensus on quality measures and may be viewed as a more neutral party.
Something resembling this has been achieved in Southern California, where many of the large health plans and physician organizations have collaborated under the Integrated Healthcare Association to develop a uniform set of pay-for-performance measures. Similarly, Medicare's incentives to hospitals to report quality measures has provided a database that insurers, vendors, and consumers can use to compare quality across hospitals. Our recent site visits suggest that this initiative has served as a catalyst for many hospitals to increase their efforts to improve quality (Pham, Coughlan, and O'Malley 2005) . Respondents note the potential that the information ultimately could affect both payment rates and patient choices of hospital.
The Role of Subsidies in Health Care
The FTC/DOJ report urges governments to reexamine the role of subsidies in health care markets in light of their inefficiencies and potential to distort competition. Indeed, subsidies -explicit, inadvertent, and informal -abound in health care. Federal and state governments directly subsidize hospitals with large numbers of uninsured patients, through payments under Medicare's disproportionate share programs and, in some states, uncompensated care pools. Federally qualified health centers receive direct grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and enhanced reimbursement from Medicaid programs. Insurer payment schedules provide inadvertent subsidies and taxes for different services and patients as they diverge from unit costs systematically (Ginsburg and Grossman 2005). In addition, hospitals have long used surpluses earned on some services or patients to support those patients who are poor and have no insurance and those services for which reimbursements are lower than costs.
The problem, which the FTC and DOJ note, is that more competitive markets will make this practice of cross-subsidization more difficult. In fact, our research has documented that this is occurring throughout markets today (Lesser, Ginsburg, and Felland 2005) . With downward pressure on provider payment rates, hospitals and physicians have become more acutely aware of differences in the relative profitability of certain services, and there has been heated competition for the high-margin services. 2 Although we suspect that differences in profitability across services has been the case for a long time, the degree to which providers are responding to these incentives appears to be a recent phenomenon. Most importantly, these distortions have opened opportunities for entities that specialize in those services and patients that are more lucrative, posing new competitive challenges to traditional acute-care hospitals. The winners in this competition need not have lower costs or higher quality -just be more nimble at taking advantage of the inadvertent distortions in pricing. But if, in so doing, the surpluses from these services are captured by niche competitors, it is unclear how general acute-care hospitals will finance critical but money-losing activities, such as services with high standby costs and care for the uninsured.
The FTC and DOJ propose addressing this problem with subsidies that are more direct, stating in its report that "it is more efficient to provide subsidies directly to those who should receive them." In an ideal world, we would agree with this, but we fear that it is not practical -particularly in the current political environment -to provide direct subsidies for all of the unfunded care that exists in the health care system today. Essentially this would involve one of two options: either subsidizing or providing insurance to achieve universal coverage or increasing direct funding to providers to account for all of their uncompensated care. 3 The scope of the problem is just too great to expect either alternative to be viable at this time.
One alternate strategy, which the FTC and DOJ clearly oppose, is to block market competition to protect cross-subsidies. This is what Congress did in the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which placed an eighteen-month moratorium on further construction of physician-owned specialty hospitals. In the same vein, a number of states have discussed bringing back certificate-of-need (CON) programs in order to block specialty hospitals, noting that other states that never discontinued their CON programs have not had physician-owned specialty hospitals attempt to enter their markets.
We believe another option can help to reduce the magnitude of threat to cross-subsidies without reducing competition: revise pricing to eliminate the disparity in relative profitability of services. Indeed, the issue of distortions in pricing in the Medicare program has gotten the attention of federal policy makers recently. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) (2005) has recommended that the Medicare moratorium be continued for two more years while policy makers develop more accurate payment rates. The Medicare administrator has indicated that, for 2006, the program will be revising inpatient payment rates to address this (McClellan 2005) . Attention to these payment issues will likely reduce the magnitude of competitive responses to inadvertent price signals, but eliminating a large proportion of the distortions in prices will take some time -if indeed it gets the political support and is technically feasible. Yet, even if distortions in pricing cannot be eradicated completely, we believe that this is a politically feasible option that policy makers can pursue now that will help to alleviate the erosion of cross-subsidies without hindering competitive market forces involved.
Conclusion
While our comments in this article have focused on two aspects of the FTC/DOJ report that we believe are problematic, we do not want to leave the impression that the report as a whole is seriously flawed. To the con-trary, we believe this report reflects careful thought to outline broad steps necessary to infuse greater competition into today's health care system. The FTC and DOJ are to be commended for the comprehensive job they have done to consult with numerous experts, stakeholders, and the public in the process of rethinking policies regarding competition and health care markets. The report that summarizes this tremendous undertaking provides a useful framework to guide policy makers and industry leaders in their efforts to push the health system to become more efficient and deliver higher-quality care. Of course, to the extent that these new initiatives are pursued, they will need to be refined and adapted to the real-world constraints of specific health care markets and important social objectives in addition to efficiency. Nonetheless, the recommendations set forth in this report offer valuable guidance to policy makers and industry leaders who are considering the potential for engaging competitive forces in health care to address the current shortcomings of the health care system in the areas of efficiency and quality of care.
